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The impact of modular products on the organization of product 
development has recently attracted interest in academia. This paper explores 
the economic rational behind the idea that modular products result in 
modular product organizations using a team-theoretic approach. An 
important implication that can be drawn from team theory is that the nature 
of the design problem and the way in which it can efficiently be decomposed 
into design tasks strongly influence the information structures of 
organizations and therefore also the extent to which the organization can be 
characterized as a modular organization. Different economic rationales 
behind task definitions are identified and discussed. The organization of 
product development activities also can be expected to vary with the main 
goal of the product development team. I argue that when the minimization 
of lead-time is the main goal one should expect to find a more modular 
product development organization among firms that follow a modular 
product development strategy compared to those that follow an integral 




 I. Introduction 
A number of authors have argued that modularization of products has profound 
implications for the organization of product development activities. For example, Ulrich  
(1995) points out that modular designs change the content and importance of different 
design phases, and that design teams become more “.. ‘supplier-like’ in the sense that 
interaction is structured and relatively infrequent” (Ulrich, 1993,p. 435). Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996, p.64) argue that products influence the design of organizations, so that 
“…modularity in products becomes an important strategy for achieving modularity in 
organizational designs” and Schilling (2000) points out that [m]odularity within the firm 
not only enables economies in product design but may also greatly simplify 
coordination” (p. 320). The argument in this paper centers on precisely the link between 
product modularization and modularization of product development organizations. The 
contribution of this paper is to provide an economic rationale for the proposition that 
modular products result in modular product organizations.  In particular, the link 
between modularization of products, increases in lead-time, and the organization of 
product development activities is investigated.  
  Modularization is a product development strategy that is based on a product 
architecture1 where different functions of a product are implemented by different and 
relatively independent physical components whose interfaces are defined by a set of 
interface standards in a way that allow for substitutability of components (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996; Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993).  This differs from an integral design 
strategy, where each component may implement many functions and where each 
function is implemented by many different components.2 The relative independence 
between components in modular products implies that improvements in one product 
function have relatively little bearing on other functions.   
 Modular product development organizations are characterized by loosely coupled 
design activities organized around loosely coupled self-managing teams. These teams 
are working within the information structure of a modular product architecture, in the 
sense that directions needed for coordination between these loosely coupled teams are 
provided by the standardized interface specification of product components. Finally, the 
development of new technologies and components is decoupled from the development 
of new product architectures. This creates a distinction between the group of designers 
(architects) that are responsible for the decomposition of a new product into functional 
components, and for defining interface specifications and the group of designers that 
                                                 
1 An architecture can be defined as “(1) the arrangement of functional elements; (2) the mapping from 
functional elements to physical components; (3) the specification of the interfaces among interacting 
physical components” (Ulrich 1995, p.420). 
2 It should be noted that products are rarely strictly modular or integral. Even in a modular product 
there may be strong interdependencies between components at the level of detailed design where the 
implementation of the ancillary functions are to be solved. 
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work on developing the different components (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Sanchez 
2000). 
 The need for any type of product organization arises with the creation of a large 
team to match the challenges of large-scale product development. Different forms of 
organizations can from an economic perspective be attributed to the different aims and 
constraints that problem solvers face. The complexity and technical interdependencies in 
the product design may well be one important constraint in forming organizations. 3 
Organizations will also be shaped by their purpose. Product development organizations 
often have to fulfill many purposes such as minimize time spend on the development of 
a new product, ensure accuracy in fulfilling design specifications, introduce new 
variants or radically new products that better fulfill customer wants or eases 
manufacturability. The efficient organizations are those that fulfill their purpose with the 
best use of the resources devoted to product development. This paper focuses on 
minimizing lead-time as the primary purpose of the organization. The innovations are 
assumed to be incremental and the levels of ambition in product development given. 
 In the product development literature there are suggestions that a link exists 
between modular product designs and improved lead-time. For example, Cusumano 
(1997) has pointed out that a modular product development strategy makes it possible to 
increase lead-time, since modular products reduce the need for iteration between tasks. 
Moreover, modular products enable a greater use of parallel product developments. 4 
This indicates that the link between modular products and lead-time in product 
development is to be found in the differences in the definition and organization of tasks 
relative to firms that pursue an integral product development strategy. The question is if 
the differences that result in an increase in lead-time in the organization of product 
development tasks are in fact reflected in a more modular product development 
organization.  
 Organizations may differ in many respects. This paper focus on how 
modularization of products may impact on first, the way in which tasks are defined in 
order to minimize lead-time and second, on the efficient organization of information 
structures of the organization. The extent to which tasks are defined more narrowly in 
                                                 
3 From the contingency theory of organization theory (Lawrence and Lorsch ,1967; Thompson, 1967), 
we know that different types of technology, and especially differences in the nature of 
interdependencies between technological tasks are important contingencies in shaping organizations. 
In the product development literature it has been pointed out that differences in the overall purpose of 
the product development effort are also likely to give rise to different organizational forms. For 
example, Fujimoto (1989) has argued that the choice of strategy (volume producer or high–end 
specialist) shapes organizations. Moreover, Wheelwright and Clark (1992) point out that the 
organization of product development depends on the degree of novelty in the products. 
4 Many other benefits have been attributed the modular product development strategy as compared to 
the integral product development strategy. These range from greater mass customization, more easy 
upgrading of products, less need for market surveys and increased lead-time (Feitzinger and Lee, 1977; 
Ulrich, 1995;  PineII, 1993;  Sanchez, 1996). Some of these benefits can be attributed mainly to the design 
of the product some mainly to the impact of modular product designs on the effective organization of 
product development activities. 
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firms that pursue a modular product development strategy is in assessing the link 
between modularity in products and organizations. This is because most system be it 
organizations or products at some level are decomposable into relatively independent 
units (Schilling, 2000). The contribution consists in specifying an economic rational 
behind the idea that modular products produce modular organizations.  
 The organization of the discussion of the link between modularization of products, 
minimizing lead-time and modular product development organizations are organized 
by answering the following two questions A) In what ways are modular product 
development strategies likely to alter the organization of product development activities 
in ways that improve lead-time relative to integral product development strategies? B) 
Will the organizational principles that maximize lead-time result in modular product 
organizations?    
 The paper is structured as follows. Section II (“Lead-Time and the Organization of 
Product Development Activities”) clarifies the concept of lead-time and introduces a 
terminology in which to describe different types of product development activities.  
Section III (“The Economic Rationales of Task Definitions”) provides a perspective informed 
by economics on the benefits of task definition.  The definition of tasks and teams is one 
way of breaking up large-scale problems up into small scale problems that can be 
managed by small teams with individuals that carry out some preliminary- or well-
defined tasks (Cusumano, 1997).  The section identifies various principles for defining 
tasks based on the economic rationales of  A) maximizing labor productivity and 
knowledge production  (Smith 1776, Simon, 1985; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nonaka, 
1994), and B) economizing on bounded rationality (Simon, 1969, Alexander 1979).  In 
Section IV (“The Structure of Information Processes”) a team-theoretical approach (Radner, 
1992; Casson, 1994; Carter, 1995) is applied to illuminate the issue of the efficient design 
of information structures that support the experimental activities that may lead to the 
production of new product concepts or new technological solutions. Section V 
(”Conclusions: Implications of Modular Product Designs on Organization in Product 
Development”) summarizes the analysis with respect to the link between minimizing 
lead-time and modular organizations.  
II. Lead-Time and the Organization of                                           
Product Development Activities 
In general terms, product development can be seen as consisting of activities such as 
information collection, information processing, creative thinking and problem solving. 
The purpose of product development is to create a new product with certain more or 
less well-defined quality characteristics and functions or to upgrade the quality of an 
established product.  The outcome of such a process is a description of a product concept 
with a set of technical specifications on how the various functions of the product are to 
be implemented in the product. The project requirements may vary greatly from project 
to project. Engineers begin with a broad set of objectives such as the price rage of the 
product and its functional requirements. Given these characteristics, the effectiveness of 
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project organization depends on the quality of the design, the costs, and on the lead-
time.  
 Lead-time in product development is perceived of as a very important variable in 
product development (Smith and Reinertsen, 1995; Meyer, 1993). It makes a company 
able to respond fast to competitors moves in product markets, enables them to adjust 
fast to new customer requirements, and is also claimed to be a source of competitive 
advantage over less fast moving competitors.  The latter may be grounded in the ability 
of a firm to earn quasi-rents on novel products because of the loyalty that customers may 
exhibit toward the first mover (Schmalensee, 1982; Shapiro, 1983 Klemperer, 1987). Lead-
time is traditionally measured as the length of time from the initiation of a concept 
generation to market introduction (Clark, Chew and Fujimoto, 1987). The lead-time of a 
project depends on the project strategy which include the differentiation and price 
ambitions of the project, the scope of the project, and the capabilities of engineers. These 
factors influence the lead-time of each of the development tasks, whereas the project 
organization influences the overall lead-time. The project organization encompasses 
such issues as the degree of specialization and the methods of integrating the tasks of 
individuals, as well as of the pattern of communication between tasks. (Clark, Chew and 
Fujimoto, 1987).  
 In the following, I use the terminology adopted by Ulrich and Eppinger (1995) to 
describe the different types of activities in product development. They characterize the 
product development process as taking place in five phases, namely 1) concept 
development, 2) system-level design, 3) detailed design, 4) testing and refinement, and 5) 
production ramp-up.  All of these phases can be described by a number of distinct 
activities that have to be performed. The purpose of the concept development phase is to 
generate the product concept for the product.  A product concept “... is an approximate 
description of the technology, working principles, and form of the product” (Ulrich and 
Eppinger, 1995, p.78). 5  At the system-level of design alternative concepts are evaluated 
and major sub-systems are defined. The detailed design activities consist of the 
development of the specific design solutions and the marketing and production 
planning. In the testing and refinement phases the design solutions and plans are tested 
and refined and finally executed in the production ramp-up phase.   In the following, I 
shall limit my attention to the concept development, the system level and the detailed 
design phases, since many of the differences between modular and integral design 
strategies arise from the different ways of tackling the information processing and 
problem solving activities in these three phases. This limited focus draws attention to the 
importance of interdependencies in the product design at the expense of the importance 
of the interdependencies between product design, production and marketing (Whitney, 
1988). This limited focus also implies that the lead-time considered here is the time from 
concept generation to product design, rather than the time from product initiation to 
                                                 
5 Ulrich and Eppinger use the word product concept in a different way compared to the general use in 
the marketing literature where a product concept is considered to be a package of functions that is 
unique. 
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market introduction. Important issues such as design for manufacturability that may 
reduce the overall lead-time is not considered.  
 Issues such as differences in ambitions of the project and the capability of the 
engineers are not considered since focus is on the influence of differences in the project 
organization on lead-time. I shall not discuss the benefits and costs of organizing 
product development departments in project or functional units (Allen and Hauptman, 
1987; Larson and Gobeli, 1988, Clark and Wheelwright, 1992) since, the main focus is on 
a single product development project rather than on the development of platform 
technologies and maintenance of technological capabilities across projects. Finally, the 
impact of outsourcing of development activities is not considered. It is thus assumed 
that the same types of activities are carried out within the project organization 
independent of whether a modular or an integral product strategy is pursued.  
 
 
III. The Economic Rationales of Task Definition 
The way in which product development projects are “broken up” and task are defined 
and allocated to individuals strongly influences the type of coordination problems that 
come to characterize the development project (von Hippel, 1990; Eppinger, Whitney, 
Smith and Gebala, 1994). However, task definition is not determined by cost of 
coordination considerations alone. In fact, coordination considerations are constraints on 
task definitions rather than the rationale behind task definitions.  Some of these 
constraints may be relaxed by clever designs of information structures. In the following 
sections, two main reasons for dividing productive activities (including problem solving) 
into sub-tasks are distinguished. First, task definition may be perceived of as a way of 
economizing with bounded rationality, and, second, task definition may be perceived of 
a division of labor in problem solving which may increase labor productivity and 
knowledge accumulation.   
 Tasks may loosely be defined as the partitioning of product development activities 
in ways which delimit more or less precisely the activities that are carried out by one or a 
group of individuals from those activities that are carried out by another individual or 
group of individuals6. At one extreme, all sub-task delimitation may take place at the 
very beginning of the product development project; at the other; it may be part of the 
ongoing process of product development. Furthermore, task delimitation may be 
performed by the person(s) appointed as responsible for the entire project or it may be 
allocated to different broadly defined teams (Johne, 1984; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; 
                                                 
6 I distinguish between activities and tasks. Tasks may encompass one or more discrete separable types 
of activities. It is difficult to pin point what makes activities separable. Some activities clearly cannot be 
separated for physical reasons. Other activities such as conducting or creating a sculpture may easily be 
separated into a number of distinct activities. However, it may be difficult to achieve the best result 
possible if the separable activities are to be carried out as separate tasks. Problems arise because skills 
or talents cannot be transferred instantly in the form of instructions.  
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Ludquist, Sundgren and Trygg, 1996). However, the economic principles behind task 
delimitation remain the same whether a firm follows a centralized or an autonomous 
model of project management. The following section therefore provides some arguments 
for delimitation of tasks in product development.  
Economizing with Bounded Rationality 
  The bounded rationality of individuals is one important reason for breaking 
complex problems up into sub problems that may be allocated to different individuals to 
be solved (Simon, 1969). One aspect of bounded computational capacity of individuals 
may be that there are sharply diminishing returns to information processing and 
problem solving as increased complexity of problem solving increases the load of 
information processing.  Diminishing returns to information processing may show up as 
inferior solutions or as more than proportional time spent on problem solving.  One way 
of overcoming the problems of diminishing returns is to divide a complex design 
problem into smaller and less complex problems.7
 Breaking up design problems is a way of economizing with bounded rationality 
even if only one person is involved in the problem solving activities (Simon 1969; Radner 
1992). However, if different individuals solve different sub-problems, it may be possible 
to economize even more on bounded rationality and thereby increase lead-time.  What 
sort of heuristics can then be used to define product development tasks in ways that 
economize the most with bounded rationality? Within the sphere of social systems the 
solution proposed by Simon (1969) is to construct sub-systems and hierarchies by 
making a chart of who interact most intensely with each other. Then, Simon explains, 
“… the clusters of dense interaction in the chart will identify a rather well defined 
hierarchic structure” (ibid., p. 88). The underlying assumption is that task definitions, 
which economize on bounded rationality, are the ones that solve some of the 
coordination problems by reducing the need for communication the most.  
 In the context of product design, Eppinger, Withney, Smith and Gebala (1994) have 
suggested a similar approach.  However, they also emphasize that there is link between 
the type of technological interdependencies that designers encounter in the product 
design and the pattern of interaction between designers. Based on various case studies, 
they find that iterations between product development tasks are reduced most when 
tasks are defined on the basis of a chart of the interaction between the design parameters 
specified by the designers.8  Von Hippel (1990) has illustrated this point very well in an 
example of the development of an airplane, where the product development problem is 
                                                 
7 Complex in the sense that it is “.. made up of a large number of parts that interact in a non simple 
way” (Simon, 1969, p.86). 
8 Eppinger, Withney, Smith and Gebala (1994) mention other factors beside information exchanges may 
also be of importance in defining tasks, for example, task duration and the degree of dependence with 
respect to “...task communication time, functional coupling, physical adjacency, electrical or vibration 
characteristics, parameter sensitivity, historical variance of task results, certainty of planning estimates, 
or the volume of information transfer” (p.4). These factors are particularly important when firms have a 
fixed number of designers employed in the organization.  
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subdivided in two different ways into two meta-tasks. In the first case one sub-problem 
consists of developing the rear end and the other sub-problem consists of developing the 
front end of the plane whereas in the second case one sub-problem is to develop the 
engine and the other to develop the aircraft body. If the design of the rear and front part 
is allocated to different teams, each team has to be fully informed about many more design 
variables than if the design of the body is allocated to one team and the design of the 
engine to the other team. Moreover, in cases where designers’ knowledge of 
interdependencies between sub-problems are incomplete, task division in accordance 
with the first example most likely would imply many iterations between problem 
definition, target specifications and problem solving tasks in detailed design as the two 
design teams discover incompatibilities in their solutions.9
 To sum up, in order to reap benefits of economizing on bounded rationality and 
reduce information processing time, task partitioning is often necessary. In specifying 
tasks, one needs to consider how to reduce the amount of information each person needs 
to receive and communicate and how to reduce the amount of design variables each 
person needs to be aware of. A first approximation to the problem of defining tasks is to 
decompose the design problem into relatively independent problems, so that for each 
sub task one only needs to discover interactions between a limited number of design 
variables. When many of the interdependencies between design variables are well 
known, the product development problems can be decomposed into the development of 
relatively independent components within limits set by interface specifications.   
  However, some decomposition of design problems may be beneficial even without 
full understanding of the nature of interdependencies between problems and therefore 
also of the nature of interdependencies in product design. Schaefer (1999) argues that in 
a product with complementarities between all design variables, an arbitrary 
decomposition of the design problem into elements is a way of increasing the 
understanding of the complementarities.  If the product development problem is 
partitioned in an arbitrary manner into sub problems, the project development group 
can perform a sort of controlled experiment by solving some sub-problems and trace the 
effects of the changes on the working of all other sub-problems. Such a “preliminary 
modularization” of products is an effective way of reducing the time of experimentation 
needed to achieve an understanding of interdependencies between design variables.  
 The extent to which iterative processes in product development can be eliminated 
depends on the nature of the design problem, the product knowledge and how this has 
been decomposed.10 Firms that pursue a highly modular product development strategy 
and have well-specified product architecture have the opportunity to decompose design 
problems differently from firms that follow a highly integral product development 
strategy. In a modular product each product function is implemented in the product by 
relatively independents components. For most incremental improvements of functions 
                                                 
9 Another indication of a difference between the two approaches is that it is much easier to reach an 
optimal design with the second approach than with the first approach.  
10 It of course also depends on whether one wants an optimal design or not.  
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the important interdependencies between design variables to be explored are likely to be 
concentrated within components rather than between components. This implies that a 
definition of design tasks in accordance with the components that have to be developed most likely 
will be the one, which reduces the need for iteration and the need for information about design 
variables most. This strategy for defining tasks not only reduces the burden on problem 
solvers' rationality; it also reduces lead-time since time consuming communication is 
reduced. 
Labor Productivity and Knowledge Creation  
 Another important reason for the partitioning of product development activities 
into tasks rests in the kinds of gains from labor specialization that were emphasized by 
Adam Smith (1776).  From Smith we know that specialization in production is one of the 
main sources of improvements in labor productivity in tasks.  This implies that an 
increase in the division of labor may contribute to a reduction in lead-time in individual 
tasks.  Smith ascribes productivity gains to improvements in workers’ skills, in time that 
is saved from avoiding having to switch from one task to another, and in labor saving 
innovations.  
In product development almost all activities have some element of skill.  For 
example, designers use heuristics and technical insight for decomposing design 
problems or for searching for conceptual solutions.  Skills may also consist in the ability 
to engage in creative processes when trying to conceptualizing new types of solutions or 
the care and accuracy with which the problem solvers design and conduct experiments 
or use simulation models. Repetition of the same types of activities over and over is the 
key to accumulation of all these diverse skills and insights. To increase the rate of 
accumulation of skills, tasks will have to be defined around activities, which can be 
repeated by solving the same type of problems. This criterion for task definition may 
also lead to a reduction of “switching costs” and an increase in “innovativeness.” In 
product development “switching costs” may arise when it takes time for an individual 
to change his mindset in order to perform a different type of activity. Such switching 
costs may, for example, arise if one has to switch between market analysis activities and 
concept development activities or even if one has to switch between the development of 
different types of components.  
 Judging from studies in the area of cognitive and behavioral science it seems that 
there is a rather complex relationship between increasing division of labor and 
innovativeness (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Innovativeness in problem solving can be 
described as the ability of an individual “... to retrieve a potentially useful piece of 
information from one’s memory and then adapting that information to the problem in 
hand” (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995, p.88) – or, put somewhat differently, to recombine 
knowledge in new ways (as in the Schumpeterian notion of innovations).    
 Bower, Langely and Simon (1983) and Simon (1985) argue that the possession of 
relevant knowledge and skills is what give rise to creative associations and innovation. 
Much of the knowledge that is needed is cumulative in the sense that knowledge of prior 
advances within a field is necessary in order to assimilate information on new advances. 
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In such cases the rate at which new knowledge can be accumulated increases with the 
stock of existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
 The building of innovative capabilities seems to be subject to a trade-off between 
accumulating a certain depth of knowledge and accumulating a certain width of 
knowledge. On the one hand innovativness requires a certain “[i]ntensity of effort” 
and  “..important aspects of learning how to solve problems are build up over many 
practice trails on related problems” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p.131). Moreover, in 
order for boundedly rational individuals to learn effectively from experience the 
complexity of the problems they solve will often have to be reduced by a 
decomposition of the problem and a rather narrow definition of the problem solving 
tasks (Levinthal and March, 1993). These factors call for a rather narrow definition of 
tasks On the other hand, a certain width of knowledge and therefore width in task 
definitions may also be important with respect to facilitating innovativeness. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) point out that “… in settings in which there is uncertainty about 
the knowledge domains from which potentially useful information may emerge, a 
diverse background provide a more robust basis for learning because it increases the 
prospect that incoming information will relate to what is already known (p.131).  This 
problem could be remedied in organizations by employing experts of diverse 
background.  However, if these experts posses only highly specialized knowledge, 
they may be unable to communicate with specialist in other sub-fields.  
 In fact the creation of new knowledge often requires interaction between 
different knowledge elements of which some are explicit and other tacit. However, 
different means of facilitating communication between specialist in sub-fields have been 
identified by Nonaka (1994). According to Nonaka, knowledge contains explicit as well 
as tacit elements (Polanyi 1962, 1967). Tacit knowledge involves both cognitive and 
technical elements. The cognitive elements consist of mental models of the world 
including schemata; paradigms, beliefs and viewpoints that help the individual 
interpret the world.  The technical elements consist of concrete know-how, crafts and 
skills that apply to a specific context.  
 Interaction between knowledge elements may come about in four different ways. 
Transfer of information is the efficient means when explicit bodies of knowledge are 
to be brought in contact while social interaction in, for example, teams is necessary if 
tacit elements are to be exchanged. Moreover, tacit knowledge may be converted to 
explicit knowledge in a process of externalization in which metaphors and actions 
play an important role and explicit knowledge may be converted into tacit knowledge 
through more traditional types of learning.  This implies that although the division of 
labor may create specialist knowledge containing tacit and explicit elements, these 
may be brought into contacts through various interaction processes of which some 
require overlapping activities and close interaction.     
 To sum up, in order to enhance innovativeness four requirements are important 
to consider when defining tasks. First, some repetition or intensity of effort in the 
performance of the tasks is important. Second, there have to be some relatedness 
between the types of problems that are to be solved in terms of the bodies of 
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knowledge. Third, the complexity of the problem has to be manageable to individuals. 
Fourth when there are great uncertainty with respect to what kind of knowledge is 
useful for problem solving knowledge accumulation have to be more extensive and 
tasks may have to be defined more broadly.  Finally, the width of the tasks depend on 
the extent to which it is possible to set up various knowledge transfer mechanisms to 
facilitate the communication between specialist with different tacit knowledge.   
 In product development both the technical and cognitive aspects of tacit 
knowledge may play an important role in many phases in the product development 
process since much of the knowledge that underlie what we ordinary refer to as skills 
is tacit.  For example, designers may posses certain skills in concept generation and in 
the design and execution of experiments needed to test technical solutions. The 
cognitive elements of tacit knowledge may create problems of communicating 
between specialist in area such as marketing, product design, and production 
functions. However, some of these costs of specialization may be overcome by the 
creation of knowledge transfer mechanism such as close links or overlapping teams in 
product development. In fact, the importance of knowledge sharing as a way of 
enhancing communication between specialists may explain the many 
recommendation of establishing close links between for example marketing and 
design or design and manufacturing (Clark and Fujimoto, 1987, Larson and Goblei, 
1988, Clark and Wheelwright, 1992).  
 The importance of overlapping tacit knowledge between specialists might also 
explain difference in the size of teams. Schaefer (1999) has argued that low inter team 
communication cost will result in small and many teams whereas low costs of intra 
team communication will result in large teams at the expense of the benefits of 
division of labor. Low inter team communication costs may be attributed to relative 
few knowledge interdependencies between problems solving activities and low intra 
team communication costs to well established overlaps in the knowledge domains of 
specialists. 
 Modular and integral product development strategies require different types of 
knowledge accumulation in order to minimize lead-time. Sanchez (2000) points out 
that with integral product development strategies designers typically try to develop 
new technologies and new product at the same time whereas with modular product 
development strategies designers learning about “new technologies, new architectures 
and new components are intentionally decoupled” (p. 11).  
 This difference in the need for knowledge accumulation has implications for the 
way in which tasks may be defined in order to enhance effective innovativness.  First, 
with an integral product development strategy there is much more uncertainty as to 
what information is relevant for effective problem solving and innovativness. This 
implies a wider definition of tasks or a wider definition of teams to create greater 
overlap in knowledge domains compared to that required of a firm pursuing a 
modular product development strategy. Second, with a modular product 
development strategy and a well defined product architecture much of the 
uncertainty in problem solving is confined to the development of the individual 
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components, which imply a definition of tasks in accordance with the development of 
components.  By defining tasks very narrowly around components one may increase 
the rate of accumulation of component specific knowledge.  
 However, component development may require many different types of 
knowledge and this may create a need for a further specialization in work tasks in 
order to ensure efficient accumulation of the diverse bodies of knowledge. This gives 
rise to a need for communication and coordination between individuals working on a 
component development project. One way of ensuring the transfer of tacit knowledge 
is to have overlapping activities another is the use of a project manager who follows 
the project through some of the phases and accumulate much of the tacit knowledge 
about the project. 11
 In the long run accumulation of component specific knowledge may be at the 
expense of the accumulation of architectural knowledge about ways in which 
components are integrated and linked together or the accumulation of the kind of 
deep knowledge of core design concepts and their implementation, which is required 
for radical innovations (Henderson and Clark 1990). Thus, firm pursuing modular 
product development strategies cannot in the long run completely avoid the need for 
overlapping tasks (teams) and will thus also have to expend some of the benefits of 
labor specialization in order to create innovativeness in architectural designs.   
 Finally, both firms that pursue integral and modular product development 
strategies may be faced with a trade-off between accumulation of component/product 
specific knowledge and accumulation of technical expertise within sub-fields such as 
various product technologies, marketing, production etc. This trade-off is often 
recognized in the debate concerning the functional organization of product 
development contra the project organization of product development (Weelwright 
and Clark, 1992). However, with modular product development strategies there is a 
certain probability that there is an overlap between specialization in component 
knowledge and specialization in sub fields within product technologies. Thus, in at 
least the short run a modular product development strategy makes it possible to improve 
knowledge accumulation in ways that improve lead-time by defining tasks accordance with 
components.  
IV. The Structure of Information Processes 
One important constraint on task definition in product development is the costs of 
coordinating individual tasks. The economic meaning of coordination is to ensure that 
given resources are used in their best given alternative uses. However, the sub-division 
                                                 
11 Clark and Weelwright (1992) have identified three different types of team structures in which project 
manager are used.  These are lightweight, heavyweight and autonomous team structures. These teams 
vary among other thing in the role and responsibility ascribed to project managers but they have in 
common the idea that a certain project manager is assigned to the project for at least some parts of the 
development process.     
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of a design problem and definition of tasks introduces obstacles to the achievement of 
coordination since different individuals will come to poses different information about 
for example customer preferences, technical solutions, critical interdependencies 
between design variables etc. Thus, efficient information structures need to be designed 
in order to overcome the problems that such dispersed information and knowledge 
introduces. Informational structures may be defined as the kind of procedures that are 
implemented in order to ensure proper communication of information between tasks.12   
 This section discusses information structures in product development from a team-
theoretical information processing perspective on organizations. From this perspective 
the efficient information structures with the efficient allocation of decision rights among 
product development tasks (or teams) is the one that economize with information 
processing costs while allowing members of the organization to take advantage of 
specialization in decision making. Information processing costs may, for example, 
consist of the costs of transmitting information, costs of investing in information 
channels, cost due to error in communication or costs of obtaining information through 
investigations (Carter, 1995; Casson, 1994; Marschak and Radner, 1977). Many of these 
costs may be interpreted as time spent on the obtaining and transfer of information or 
time spend on correction of errors in decision making due to faulty communications. 
The team-theoretical perspective therefore provides a basis on which to identify costs 
saving information structures of modular and integral product development strategies 
that may lead to decreased lead-time in product development. In the analysis of efficient 
information structures the standard team theoretical simplifying assumption of incentive 
compatibility are assumed to apply 
 The nature of the design problem and the way in which it is decomposed play an 
important role with respect to determining the design of information structures since 
interdependencies in problems solving define the need for communication between 
tasks.  Two characteristics of the decomposed problems are important for the structuring 
of the information-processing network. The first important characteristic is the extent to 
which a problem is characterized by what Casson (1994) refers to as “decisiveness” and 
the second important characteristic is the extent to which a problem is characterized by 
what Radner (1992) refers to as “associative operations”. The first characteristic refers to the 
extent to which sequential interdependencies characterize information processing, so 
that coordination between information processing activities are needed. The latter 
characteristics refers to a situation, where some of the information processing activities 
can be carried out independently of other information processing activities. The need for 
coordination of the information processing activities arises if the individual pieces of 
information needs to be synthesized in order to reach some sort of decision. 13   
                                                 
12 Galvin (1999) points out that in connections with product modularity the term information structure 
is often used to denote only the type of product design information that is captured in what Baldwin 
and Clark (1997) call visible design rules. In team theory the term information structure is used in a 
broader sense to cover the entire spectra of information required for decision making.     
13 It should be noted that the logical structure of problems which gives rise to natural decisiveness is 
different from that which gives rise to associative processes. Decisiveness and associative processes do 
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 In the following sections, I argue that with a modular product development 
strategy the design problem has consciously been transformed into a problem that allow 
for the minimization of lead time by means of an extensive use of specialization in tasks 
and the implementation of rather simple and not very time consuming information 
structures of communication.  
Decisiveness, Lead-time and the Definition of Information Structures  
 When a design problem is broken down into sub-problems the solution to each 
sub- problem may be conditional on the solution of other sub-problems and important 
information may be lost when tasks are narrowly defined around sub-problems.  For 
example, it may sometimes be important for designers of complementary components to 
know how a certain solution concept reacts to changes in test conditions rather than just 
to know that this solution concept has been chosen. As pointed out by Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996), “… information and assumptions underlying upstream design 
decisions may not be transferred intact to downstream stages of development. Technical 
incompatibilities between interdependent components may then actually be ‘designed 
into’ downstream components” (p. 69).   
 One important aspect of decision problems is the extent to which these are 
characterized by decisiveness with respect to the communication of information (Casson 
1994). Decisiveness is the key to whether or not individuals will share information in 
some sort of consultation or not: “... [d]ifferences in decisiveness mean that some 
problems have a logical structure which supports solutions without consultation and 
some do not” (ibid. p.50).  Natural decisiveness occurs when there is a serial 
interdependence (Eppinger et al. 1994) between two decision takers. Moreover, decision 
taker B´s can solve his problem equally well by substituting knowledge about the 
premises for the decision reached by decision taker A with information about the 
decision he has reached. This is important when the premises for the decision is more 
costly to transmit than information about the decision that has been reached. For 
example, the concept generation process and the detailed design are characterized by 
decisiveness when the choice of a product concept can be carried out on the basis of 
information about customer preferences alone independent of information about the 
constraint set by knowledge about product technologies and design solutions. Moreover, 
the team that works on the system level design only needs information about the 
concept chosen in order to fulfil their obligations they need not have information about 
the actual customer requirements. If concept generation and detailed design require 
market information as well as information about technological factors there is no 
decisiveness since neither decision can be taken without knowledge of the factors that 
affect the other decision. 14
                                                                                                                                                          
not preclude one another. In the case of associative processes there are no logical sequence to follow. 
However, the communication will be structured by the way in which one has chosen to organize 
problem solving into an efficient hierarchical network  (Radner, 1992). 
14 One problem not dealt with here stem from the fact that often product developers do not know that 
they posses information that is valuable to other product developers. This creates what Hoopes and 
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Decisiveness is an important consideration in the design of information structures 
when some information is costly to transmit as may be the case when there is sticky 
information in design (von Hippel, 1994). Ulrich and Eppinger (1995) provide a fine 
example from the development of a fork for a mountain bike, where sticky information 
played an important role. The team who performed the market analysis identified 
customer needs as   “easy to install”.  For the team that performed the translation of 
customers needs into target specification this was a too ambiguous statement, since it 
could be translated into a number of different technical specifications, such as “time to 
assembly” or  “assembled by use of simple tools and simple movements”. Such types of 
sticky information may cause errors in decision taking. More generally sticky 
information refers to the situation where costs of transferring information is high due to 
the way in which it is encoded or due to the lack of “absorptive capacity” of receivers of 
the information, for example, because they lack an understanding of the context in 
which the information is derived.  
Errors in communication (Carter, 1995) is another source of costs of 
communication. Errors in communication can, for example, be interpreted as a small 
probability that the wrong decision premises are communicated or because tacit 
information is incorrectly encoded into memos, plans or interface standards.  
 An example (based on Casson 1994) may serve to illustrate the implication of 
decisiveness on the design of information structures. Assume that in a product 
development project one of two product concepts and one of two technological 
solutions have to be chosen. The optimization problem of concept selection and 
selection of technological solutions consists of selecting the concept and technological 
solution that under conditions A (customer preferences) and B (state of technological 
knowledge available to designers) generates the greatest revenue to the firm.  
 A represents customer preferences which can be of two kinds and a1 and a2. The 
two concepts that can be selected are ax and ay.  B represents states of technological 
knowledge available to designers that can either  b1 and  b2. Designers can select either 
of two technological solutions bx or  by. The maximum price that concept ax can 
generate is P0  if customer preferences are a1 while the maximum price that concept ay  
can generate under the same conditions is  2P1  where P0.> P1. However, if customer 
preference are of the kind a2  the maximum price rise with r for both concepts. The 
costs of using technical solution bx or  by   depend on the concept chosen and on the 
state of technological knowledge b1 and  b2 .  With concept ax the costs of development 
of technical solution bx is  c0 when  b=b1 while with concept ay it becomes 2c0. The 
costs of development of technical solution by is c1+f1 +f2 with concept ax and 
technological knowledge b=b1  and twice as much with concept ay. However, if 
                                                                                                                                                          
Postrel (1999) term “glitches” which are costly mistakes or costly duplications of work. According to 
Hoopes and Postrel such costs can be avoided though information integration mechanisms such as 
overlapping team activities. This is because those who posses valuable information is likely to discover 
the need for communicating it to the relevant decision takers. This implies that in the choice of efficient 
information structure managers must take into account their ignorance of who poses what kind of 
valuable information. 
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technological knowledge b=b2 the costs are reduced with f2 independent of concept 
chosen. Table 1 specifies the revenue functions for different choices of product 
concepts and technological solutions in different states of customer preference and 
technological knowledge. 
  
 XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
 
 The extent to which there is decisiveness depends on the parameters of the 
revenue functions. As the problem is specified above decisiveness occurs, for example 
if r>1.25 or r> .75+f2 or if f1 is zero and r>. 25 (Casson, 1994). Under these conditions 
customer preferences are always decisive for the choice of concept and for the choice 
of technology. This implies that the team engaged in the selection of concepts can 
make a decision without information about the state of technological knowledge. 
Moreover, they only need to communicate their choice of concept in order for the 
team engaged in specific design to select the technology on the basis of their 
investigation of the state of technological knowledge. 
  In Table 2 an asterisk indicates the optimal choices of concepts and technology 
when customer preferences are decisive and the decision problem is characterized by 
the following parameter values: p0=4; p1=3; r=1; c0=3.25; c1=2,25; f1=0 and f2=1.5.   
 
 
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 2 Here XXXXXXXX 
 
 In Table 3 an asterisk indicates the optimal choices of concepts and technology 
when three is no decisiveness and the decision problem is characterized by the 
following parameter values: p0=4; p1=3; r=1; c0=3.25; c1=2.25; f1=1,5 and f2=1.5. 
 
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 3 Here XXXXXXXX 
 The various information structures between marketing and design can be 
summarized into seven types of structures (Casson, 1994 and Carter, 1995). They are: 
centralized or pooled, marketing- or design-led, marketing- or design-dominated, or 
routine decisions. With pooled or centralized information structures all available 
information about customer preference and technological knowledge is used in 
making the decision. With the centralized structure information about states and 
available options in terms of concepts and technological solutions are communicated 
to a central decision taker, whereas in the case of pooled information this information 
is communicated between the marketing and the design team. When information 
structures are marketing-led, the marketing team investigates customer requirements 
and makes a decision about what concept to choose. They communicate their decision 
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to the design team who investigates the technological knowledge available and make 
a decision on the basis of their knowledge of the decision of the marketing team and 
their investigation.  With a design-led structure, the order of communication is 
reversed. In the case of a marketing-dominated structure, marketing investigates 
customer preferences and makes a decision about the concept. This is communicated 
to the design team who makes a decision about the technical solution to implement 
without making inquiry into the state of technological knowledge. Routine decisions 
occur if one dispenses with investigation of both states.  
The problem of selecting an optimal information interface between marketing 
and design depends on: a) the costs of communicating information between the two 
activities relative to that of communicating to a central decision taker; b) the costs of 
investigating the relevant states (A and B), and; c) the losses in terms of wrong 
decisions due to suppression of information about states and choices of concepts.   
 Decisiveness implies that when there is no communication costs and 
investigation costs, the optimal design of the information structure may be one of 
marketing or design led decision taking (depending on the nature of decisiveness). 
These information structures imply a batch communication (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992) between marketing and design with the two tasks being performed sequentially 
since information about the decision reached by the team with the decisive decision 
has to be transmitted before the other team can make their decision. 
 In cases where there is no decisiveness the optimal information structures are 
either consultative (overlapping teams) or centralized with the communication of 
decision premises to a central decision taker. Communication may be sequential or 
instantaneous, depending on the extent to which some overlap in knowledge creation 
is required for the effective transfer of tacit or sticky information. Intensive 
communication (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992) may, for example, be needed so that 
designers may have to be engaged in interpreting marketing information or marketing 
may have to investigating technological knowledge. 
 Decisiveness can sometimes be imposed on problems by dispensing with the 
communication of the decision premises. Extensive consultation may then be substituted 
for sequential decision taking resulting in either marketing or a design led information 
structures (depending of the costs of communicating either customer preferences or 
technological knowledge)15. Imposing decisiveness on a problems may be efficient if 
only one party hold information that is highly likely to be decisive or if the consequences 
of an incorrect decision are perceived of as small relative to the costs of communicating 
all the relevant information.  
 Of the two types of information structures the design led is only more efficient 
(with the given decision parameters of the non-decisive decision problem) if the costs 
of communicating design plans to marketing are much lower than the reversed type 
                                                 
15 Sequential decision-taking requires that the knowledge that has to be transferred is not tacit or sticky 
in the sense that common experience is required in order to interpret the information.  
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of communication. However, communication costs can be reduced by making one of 
the states the normal state so that communication only takes place if investigation 
reveal the unusual state. For example, in the case where there are no- natural 
decisiveness (table2) the states a=a2 or b=b2 may be made the natural states. If the 
unusual states occur decisions will have to be made in a consultative manner.  Which 
of the states that are to be made the natural state depends on the probability of its 
occurrence. Another means of reducing information-processing costs is to dispense 
with investigations of the decision premises.  This may be efficient if an investigation 
of decision premises (the states) is very costly relative to the expected benefit on the 
quality of decisions. 
 As mentioned earlier the efficient information structure in product development 
depends on the nature of the design problem and the information processing costs. In 
relation to the design of efficient information structures an important difference between 
modular and integral product development stem from the fact that with a modular 
product development strategy the architecture and the interface specification of the 
product is determined independently of the development of the specific technological 
solutions that implement the various product functions.  
 This implies that the choice of architecture is made decisive for the choice of the 
specific design solutions. In fact, one may interpret the establishment of a product 
architecture that spans several generations of products as a way of making this 
architecture the natural state which is to be taken for granted in the choice of the specific 
design solutions. Moreover, the specification of stable interface standards for 
components in ways that eliminated interactions between the specific design solutions 
may be interpreted as a way of eliminating the need for investigations of “states ” by the 
designers engaged in developing these solutions. Interface specifications simply 
eliminate changes in the decision premises caused by interdependencies between design 
solutions. If interface standards “freezes states” it creates independence between 
problems in a way that makes it possible to solve problems concurrently.  One way 
communication, elimination of investigations of states, and concurrent design are all 
means of reducing lead-time relative to problem solving that require extensive 
consultation.  
 However, with integral product designs it may also be possible to carry out some 
of the detailed design activities concurrently. The information structures characterized as 
marketing dominated, design dominated or routine makes it possible to engage in 
concurrent design activities. With these information structures states are either not 
investigated at all or only one state is investigated. This is efficient if costs of 
investigation are higher than the expected outcome of investigation and that may very 
well be the case for some design decisions. Moreover, the costs of making the wrong 
decisions in detailed design may be reduced if tasks are made only partially concurrent. 
The “downstream” team then can make an early involvement in the decisions of the 
upstream team in order to better predict the choice of solution (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992).  
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Associative Operations, Lead-Time and Parallel Information Processing  
 A special case of concurrency in design activities is the use of parallel information 
processing. Information processing often is a time consuming activity which imply that 
lead-time may be improved if it is possible to economize on the time spend on 
information processing. Some of the information processing in product development has 
to do with search for alternative concepts and solutions to specific problems. In these 
processes there are time to be saved with the introduction of parallel problem solving.  
 Parallel problem solving requires that the problem to be solved in its entirety have 
to be characterized by what Radner (1992) calls “associative operations”. With associative 
operations the sequence in which the sub-operations are carried out do not matter to the 
entire result. Linear information transformation and pattern matching are the two 
paradigm cases of associative operations. Linear transformation takes place when a set 
of information is transformed into another set of information by the use of some sort of 
algorithm of transformation. Computing the value of 100 kilo gold from US $ into 
Singapore $ is an example of transformation by means of a linear decision rule. An 
example from product development is the transformation of customer statements into 
target specification. Most likely it is not possible to specify explicitly how this 
transformation is to be performed but individuals with the same education and 
experience may employ some of the same tacit heuristics in performing this activity. 
Thus, it may be possible to allocate this type of activity to different individuals with the 
same education and have them perform the translation in parallel.  
 Pattern matching takes place when a sets of data is compare with a reference set of 
date in order to find the closest match. An example of this may the comparison of 
dimensions of many different design solutions to a specific design problem in order to 
find the one that matches a set of specifications. Linear transformations and pattern 
matching activities makes it possible to organize information processing in a hierarchical 
manner by defining tasks so that groups of individuals compare sub-sets of solutions 
and each find the best solutions to the sub-sets problems. Sub-problems are synthesized 
by sequentially eliminating or transforming sub-solutions until a final solution is arrived 
at. The implementation of such a hierarchical information processing structure may be a 
time saving strategy if there are many solutions to be evaluated.  
 However, there are limits to the hierarchy because delays in problem solving 
occurs when problems have to move up the hierarchy of information processing tasks 
because at the apex of the hierarchy capacity cannot be expanded by adding more 
individuals to perform this activity. An efficient problem-solving network is one where 
there is an optimal tradeoff between serial and parallel processing. If problem solving is 
not an ongoing process and if idle capacity represents no costs this is achieved when for 
a given amount of information “… the number of processors cannot be decreased 
without increasing the delay, or vice versa” (Radner, 1992, p. 1395). When information 
arrive continually one can typically reduce delay time by expanding the network as 
compared to the optimal one shot problem-solving network.   
 Diminishing returns to parallel problem solving may also occur when product 
development managers contemplate a parallel team strategy as a mean of gathering 
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information about solutions to a design problem16. As argued by Nelson (1959) the costs 
of using several teams during the initial stage of design is small relative to the benefits 
that may accrue from the information gathering. However, increases in teams add costs 
in a linear fashion while the probability of discovering a better solution increases in a 
hyperbolic fashion moving asymptotic toward 1 this determine an upper bound on the 
efficient number of teams (Arditti and Levy, 1980)17.    
 In general a more intensive use of parallel transformation and pattern matching 
contributes to the minimization of lead-time by reducing information-processing time. 
Modular product development strategies are likely to exhibit greater possibilities for 
implementing hierarchical information processing strategies due to independence 
between component design solutions.  
   
V. Conclusion: Implications of Modular Product Designs on 
Organizations in Product Development 
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide an economic rationale behind the 
proposition that modular products result in modular product organizations.  An 
assumption behind this proposition is that modular organizations are efficient means of 
coordinating product development activities for firms that pursue modular product 
development strategies.  However, the efficiency of one type of organization compared 
to other types of organizations are not easily assessed unless one considers the aim of the 
organization and the constraints facing members of the organization in reaching the aim. 
In this paper I have taken the minimization of lead-time in product development to be 
the primary aim of the organization and the interdependencies in product designs along 
with costs of communication to be the main constraints facing product designers.   
The analysis of the link between modularization in products, lead-time, and 
modularization of organizations has been pursued in two steps.  The first, step was to 
investigate how modularization of products influences the efficient definition of tasks 
and information structures.  The second step will be to investigate whether the efficient 
definition of tasks and information structures result in what some writers in the area of 
new product development have termed modular organizations.   
The previous sections have analyzed the link between minimization of lead-time in 
product development and the organization of product development activities.  Based on 
this analysis it seems reasonable to assume that organizations pursuing a goal of 
                                                 
16 Parallel information processing may also be employed as a way of creating more variety in solutions 
since the variation in the suggestions of design solutions may increase by having different individuals 
engaged in the transformation processes. 
17Based on a study of two different design projects Marples (1961) finds that parallel search for design 
solutions are most likely to occur when organizations have sufficient manpower and when the problem 
is not felt to be so difficult that a number of feasible solutions seems improbable.    
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improving lead-time will exhibit differences with respect to definitions of tasks and 
information structures depending on whether their product development strategy is an 
integral or a modular product development strategy. Moreover, the differences in the 
organization of product development stem from the differences in the interdependencies 
between design decisions.  
I have argued that with respect to the definition of tasks modular product 
development strategies are likely to produce organizations in which the tasks of detailed 
design are likely to be rather narrowly defined in accordance with the relatively 
independent components that implements the various product functions. This definition 
will improve lead-time by economizing on bounded rationality as well as by improving 
the rate of accumulation of skills and innovativeness with respect to various product 
functions. For firms pursuing an integral product development strategy the efficient task 
definition is much harder to predict, since interdependencies in design decisions will 
differ depending on the specific product to be developed.  However, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that a much greater interdependence between tasks is likely to persist no 
matter how tasks are defined. Moreover, there is likely to be more uncertainty with 
respect to the type of knowledge that is needed to solve design problems. This implies 
that tasks are likely to be defined in a less narrow manner. 
  The organization of the information structure that improves lead-time the most is 
one that makes use of the least amount of communication between tasks in order to 
ensure coordination between tasks, while at the same time maximizes the gains from a 
division of labor in problems-solving and information processing.  With a modular 
product development strategy it is likely that firms may make greater use of a kind of 
information structure labeled “routine” (Carter, 1995) compared to firms pursuing 
integral product development strategies. This information structure is likely to be 
efficient with respect to the organization of much of the detailed design activities 
because the information that the designers need are embodied in the interface standards 
that are defined as part of the product architecture. With integral product development 
strategies there will be a much greater need for investigation of decision premises and 
communication of information between the tasks that make up the detailed design 
activities so that more investigation and communication intensive information structures 
are the efficient choice. However, communication costs can be saved to the extent that 
some detailed decisions are characterized by decisiveness. 
 With a modular product development strategy the organization of the information 
exchange between concept generation activities and detailed design are also likely to 
differ from that pursued with an integral product development strategy. This is because 
with a modular product the architecture of the product is decided before the detailed 
design activities begin whereas with the integral product development process the 
architecture emerge from the solutions to the detailed design problems. The modular 
product development strategy therefore should provide greater opportunities for 
imposing decisiveness on the decisions that link concept development, system level 
design and detailed design activities.    
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Finally, with a modular product development strategy a much more extended use 
of parallel information processing is likely to be an efficient way of minimizing lead-
time. In particular, firms pursuing integral and modular product development strategies 
are likely to differ with respect to the use of concurrent design activities in the detailed 
design. However, with integral design strategies some concurrency in the design 
activities can be accomplished by having partly overlapping tasks since this may allow 
the “downstream” designers to better predict the outcome of the “up stream” design 
activities before these are finalized.   
To sum up, firms that pursue a modular product development strategy may 
minimize lead time with more narrowly defined product development tasks and with 
the implementation of information structures that rely on less information gathering, 
greater independence in decision taking and more parallel information processing 
compared to firm that pursue integral product development strategies.  
From the above analysis it seems reasonable to characterize the organization that 
emerge with modular product development strategies to be modular organizations at 
least with respect to the organization of incremental innovations. The rather loose 
coupling of design activities could be expected to result in an extended specialization 
across firms and Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) have observed the emergence of such 
patterns of specialization is among producers of aircraft engines and of chemical plants.  
The literature on modularity also claims that the development of new components 
will be decoupled from the development of new product architectures. The analysis 
pursued in this paper has not systematically taken into account the nature of the 
knowledge and information interdependencies between architectural innovations and 
modular innovations in components. But it is likely that architectural innovations may 
require an organization in which tasks and information structures are at least 
temporarily redefined in manners that make the organization less modular in order to 
facilitate trail and error learning processes and cross- component knowledge 
accumulation. However, some specialization between architectural developers and 
components developers may take place as observed by Brusoni and Prencipe in the 
aircraft engine and chemical plant production.  Their study do, however, reveal that 
developers of new product architectures typically had a wide technology base, a good 
understanding of customer needs and undertook some detailed design in particulary 
critical components. Moreover, they coordinated development work across firms 
through highly interactive types of information structures.  
 Other factors that may influence the link between product and organizational 
design stem from the trade-off between accumulation of the kind of knowledge that 
underlie functional expertise and the kind of knowledge accumulation that underlie 
product or component expertise. When both types of knowledge is necessary in to 
ensure effective innovativeness task definitions may have to encompass both 
“functional” and project activities. This may require more extended coordination of 
project due to capacity constraints and due to the gradual entrance and exit of project 
team members. Finally, the efficient organization of product development also needs to 
take incentive considerations into account. 
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The revenue and cost functions of different choices of concepts and technology 
                                          B                                      b1                                                            b2 
                A                                      bx                         by                                 bx                     by           
Ay  P0-co   p0-c1-f1-f2 p0-c0 p0-c1-f1    
a1 Ax 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1-f2 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1 
Ay p0+r-c0 p0+r-c1-f1-f2 p0+r-c0 p0+r-c1-f1  
a2 Ax 2p1+2r-2c0 2p1+2r-2c1-f1-f2   2p1+2r-2c0 2p1+2r-2c1-f1 
 
Table 2 
Optimal choice of concepts and technology when customer preferences are decisive 
                                          B                                      b1                                                            b2 
         A                                      bx                         by                                 bx                     by           
ay  p0-co  *  p0-c1-f1-f2 P0-c0 p0-c1-f1  *  
a1 ax 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1-f2 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1 
ay p0+r-c0 p0+r-c1-f1-f2 P0+r-c0 p0+r-c1-f1  




Optimal choice of concept and technological solution if there is no decisiveness in decisions. 
 
                             B                                      b1                                                            b2 
         A                                      bx                         by                                 bx                     by           
ay  p0-co  *  p0-c1-f1-f2 P0-c0* p0-c1-f1    
a1 ax 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1-f2 2p1-2c0 2p1-2c1-f1 
ay p0+r-c0* p0+r-c1-f1-f2 P0+r-c0 p0+r-c1-f1  
a2 ax 2p1+2r-2c0 2p1+2r-2c1-f1-f2   2p1+2r-2c0 2p1+2r-2c1-
f1* 
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